



# Public Cloud made in Sweden

# Open infra forum

## Tekniska & "Juridiska" frågor och extern påverkan av CSP

# Hello! I'm Richard

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Ancautus

# ”Allmänt kända” problem i leveranskedjor och beroenden

Förtroendeproblem (tillverkning, handel, leverans)  
Livslängd/uppdateringar/support  
Tredjeparts leverantörer och tjänster  
Förfalskning av produkter/komponenter  
”Legacy” hårdvara/mjukvara/protokoll  
M.m.

# På väg ut i molnet?

- Strategi
- Teknik/säkerhet
- Processer
- Juridik


# Beroendekedjor...

## Extern påverkan på företag (informationsinhämtning)



# Exempel AWS

Vem "äger" informationen?  
Vem tar sig rätten till informationen?



# Men ärligt... delas information?

JA!

Varning! Statistik!

# AWS Law enforcement & FISA requests



January 1, 2019, through June 30, 2019 (AWS only)

|                   |     |
|-------------------|-----|
| <b>Subpoenas:</b> | 216 |
| Full response:    | 149 |
| Partial response: | 18  |
| No response:      | 49  |

|                         |    |
|-------------------------|----|
| <b>Search warrants:</b> | 31 |
| Full response:          | 19 |
| Partial response:       | 7  |
| No response:            | 5  |

|                            |    |
|----------------------------|----|
| <b>Other court orders:</b> | 23 |
| Full response:             | 10 |
| Partial response:          | 3  |
| No response:               | 10 |

|                                    |       |
|------------------------------------|-------|
| <b>National security requests:</b> | 0-249 |
|------------------------------------|-------|

|                           |   |
|---------------------------|---|
| <b>Non-U.S. requests:</b> | 8 |
| Full response:            | 1 |
| Partial response:         | 0 |
| No response:              | 7 |

January 1, 2020, through June 30, 2020 (AWS only)

|                   |     |
|-------------------|-----|
| <b>Subpoenas:</b> | 269 |
| Full response:    | 46  |
| Partial response: | 146 |
| No response:      | 77  |

|                         |    |
|-------------------------|----|
| <b>Search warrants:</b> | 37 |
| Full response:          | 8  |
| Partial response:       | 23 |
| No response:            | 6  |

|                            |    |
|----------------------------|----|
| <b>Other court orders:</b> | 38 |
| Full response:             | 13 |
| Partial response:          | 15 |
| No response:               | 10 |

|                                    |       |
|------------------------------------|-------|
| <b>National security requests:</b> | 0-249 |
|------------------------------------|-------|

|                           |    |
|---------------------------|----|
| <b>Non-U.S. requests:</b> | 18 |
| Full response:            | 3  |
| Partial response:         | 5  |
| No response:              | 10 |

Källa 1: [https://d1.awsstatic.com/certifications/Information\\_Request\\_Report\\_June\\_2019.pdf](https://d1.awsstatic.com/certifications/Information_Request_Report_June_2019.pdf)

Källa 2: [https://d1.awsstatic.com/certifications/Information\\_Request\\_Report\\_June\\_2020.pdf](https://d1.awsstatic.com/certifications/Information_Request_Report_June_2020.pdf)

# Microsoft, Law enforcement & FISA requests



## 2020 (Jan-Jun) - Sweden


### Requests

Total number of requests




210

Accounts/users specified in request



275

### Disclosures



## 2020 (Jul-Dec) - Sweden

### Requests

Total number of requests




199

Accounts/users specified in request



357

### Disclosures



Foreign  
Intelligence  
Surveillance Act  
(FISA) Orders

| Reporting period | Orders seeking disclosure of content | Accounts impacted by orders seeking content | Orders seeking disclosure of only non-content | Accounts impacted by non-content orders |
|------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| Jan - June 2020  | 0 - 499                              | 14,000 - 14,499                             | 0 - 499                                       | 0 - 499                                 |
| July - Dec 2019  | 0 - 499                              | 14,500 - 14,999                             | 0 - 499                                       | 0 - 499                                 |
| Jan - June 2019  | 0 - 499                              | 14,000 - 14,499                             | 0 - 499                                       | 0 - 499                                 |
| July - Dec 2018  | 0 - 499                              | 13,500 - 13,999                             | 0 - 499                                       | 0 - 499                                 |
| Jan - June 2018  | 0 - 499                              | 13,000 - 13,499                             | 0 - 499                                       | 0 - 499                                 |

Källa 1: <https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/corporate-responsibility/law-enforcement-requests-report>

Källa 2: [https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/corporate-responsibility/us-national-security-orders-report?activetab=pivot\\_1%3aprimar2](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/corporate-responsibility/us-national-security-orders-report?activetab=pivot_1%3aprimar2)



# Google, FISA requests

A FISA request can include a demand for a user's content, such as Gmail messages, documents, photos, and videos.

| Reporting period    | Number of requests                        | Number of accounts |
|---------------------|-------------------------------------------|--------------------|
| Jan 2020 – Jun 2020 | Data subject to six month reporting delay |                    |
| Jul 2019 – Dec 2019 | 0 – 499                                   | 74500 – 74999      |
| Jan 2019 – Jun 2019 | 0 – 499                                   | 69500 – 69999      |
| Jul 2018 – Dec 2018 | 500 – 999                                 | 63000 – 63499      |
| Jan 2018 – Jun 2018 | 500 – 999                                 | 54500 – 54999      |
| Jul 2017 – Dec 2017 | 500 – 999                                 | 44000 – 44499      |
| Jan 2017 – Jun 2017 | 500 – 999                                 | 35000 – 35499      |

Källa 1: <https://transparencyreport.google.com/user-data/us-national-security>

# Apple, Sverige req



## Government Requests January - June 2020

### Requests Received

180

Device

9

Financial Identifier

77

Account

0

Emergency

### Requests for Customer Data

| Request Type<br>⊕       | Requests<br>Received ⊕ | Identifiers Specified in<br>Requests ⊕ | Requests where Data<br>Provided ⊕ | Percentage of Requests<br>where Data Provided ⊕ |
|-------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Device                  | 180                    | 4,889                                  | 168                               | 93%                                             |
| Financial<br>Identifier | 9                      | 10                                     | 6                                 | 67%                                             |
| Account                 | 77                     | 116                                    | 67                                | 87%                                             |
| Emergency               | 0                      | -                                      | 0                                 | -                                               |

Källa: <https://www.apple.com/legal/transparency/se.html>

# GitHub req

GitHub



## National security letters and orders


0-249

National security  
letters and orders  
received


0-249

Affected accounts

## User information disclosed (by type)



## User notifications of legal request disclosures



# Slack req



| Reporting Period              | Type of request                   | Number of requests | Content data and non-content data disclosed | Only non-content data disclosed |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| United States                 |                                   |                    |                                             |                                 |
| January 1 - December 31, 2020 | Search Warrants                   | 10                 | 10                                          | 0                               |
|                               | Court Orders                      | 10                 | 0                                           | 8                               |
|                               | Subpoenas                         | 18                 | 0                                           | 14                              |
|                               | National Security Requests        | 0                  | 0                                           | 0                               |
| Non-US Entities               |                                   |                    |                                             |                                 |
|                               | Foreign requests pursuant to MLAT | 0                  | 0                                           | 0                               |

Men...

Vilka leverantörer nyttjar Slack då?

# Extern påverkan på företag

- FISA Act  
**F**oreign **I**ntelligence **S**urveillance **A**ct of 1978
- USA Patriot Act  
**U**niting and **S**trengthening **A**merica by **P**roviding  
**A**ppropriate **T**ools **R**equired to **I**ntercept and **O**bstruct  
**T**errorism **A**ct
- USA Freedom Act  
**U**niting and **S**trengthening **A**merica by **F**ulfilling  
**R**ights and **E**nsuring **E**ffective **D**iscipline **O**ver  
**M**onitoring Act of 2015
- Cloud Act  
**C**larifying **L**awful **O**verseas **U**se of **D**ata **A**ct



# FISA,

## informationsinhämtning

- Omfattar & reglerar fysiskt och elektroniskt underrättelsearbete riktat mot "främmande makter" inklusive "agenter."

Lagen innan justeringar/tillägg av Patriot Act, Protect America Act, FISA Amendments Act och Freedom Act omfattade först enbart underrättelseverksamhet inom USA, inklusive "agenter" då det riktas mot amerikanska medborgare.

FISA ursprungliga syfte var att låta domstolar och kongressen få ökad insikt i USA:s hemliga underrättelsearbete.



# FISA 702

Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) is a statute that authorizes the:

**- collection, use, and dissemination of electronic communications content** stored by U.S. internet service providers (such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft),


**or traveling across the internet's "backbone"** (with the compelled assistance of U.S. telecom providers such as AT&T and Verizon).

# FISA 702

Section 702 does not require that the surveillance target be a suspected terrorist, spy, or other agent of a foreign power.

Section 702 only requires that the targets **be non-U.S. persons located abroad**, and that a **“significant purpose”** of the surveillance be to obtain **“foreign intelligence information”** (the primary purpose of the surveillance can be something else entirely).

## Section 702 Surveillance



# Cloud act,

## Brottsbekämpning

"To amend title 18, United States Code, to improve law enforcement access to data stored across borders, and for other purposes."

"...electronic communication service (ECS) or remote computing service (RCS) provider must comply with existing requirements to preserve, backup, or disclose the contents of an electronic communication or noncontent records or information pertaining to a customer or subscriber, regardless of whether the communication or record is located within or outside the United States. "

"In response to an order from a foreign government with which the United States has an executive agreement on data access, an ECS or RCS provider may:

- intercept or disclose the contents of an electronic communication, and
- disclose the contents of a stored electronic communication or noncontent records or information pertaining to a subscriber or customer. "



# Dags nu att jämföra...



# Lagar att känna till

- Cybersäkerhetslagen
- NIL
- DSL
- PIPL



# National Intelligence Law ("NIL"),

## Bl.a Informationsinhämtning

- NIL gäller globalt för **kinesiska företag**, där alla dotterbolag, även de utanför Kina, kan omfattas av NIL
- NIL gäller alla "**organisationer**" i Kina, en term som verkar omfatta alla typer av företag etablerade i Kina, oavsett ägande, dvs. privata och offentliga kinesiska aktieägare såväl som utländska aktieägare.
- NIL skulle endast gälla de **kinesiska dotterbolagen till en icke-kinesisk grupp**. Ett moderbolag utanför Kina skulle inte omfattas av kinesisk jurisdiktion enligt internationell offentlig rätt.
- NIL gäller för **alla kinesiska medborgare**, och eftersom NIL inte verkar ha en uttrycklig geografisk begränsning kan det tolkas så att det gäller alla kinesiska medborgare även när de är bosatta utanför Kina.



Källa 1: <http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/201806/483221713dac4f31bda7f9d951108912.shtml>

Källa 2: [https://www.mannheimerswartling.se/globalassets/nyhetsbrev/msa\\_nyhetsbrev\\_national-intelligence-law\\_jan-19.pdf](https://www.mannheimerswartling.se/globalassets/nyhetsbrev/msa_nyhetsbrev_national-intelligence-law_jan-19.pdf)

# Observera!

Vid en mer korrekt översättning av NIL är termen "organisation" mycket bredare än just ett "företag".



Med "organisation" avses alla typer av sammansatta grupperingar, exempelvis: Fackförbund, intresseorganisationer, lobbyorganisationer, bokklubbar, etc.



# National Intelligence Law ("NIL"),

## Bl.a Informationsinhämtning

### **Article 7:**

All organizations and citizens shall support, assist and cooperate with national intelligence work in accordance with the law, and keep the secrets of national intelligence work that they know. The state protects individuals and organizations that support, assist, and cooperate with the national intelligence work.

### **Article 9:**

The state commends and rewards individuals and organizations that have made major contributions to national intelligence work.

### **Article 14:**

National intelligence work agencies carrying out intelligence work in accordance with the law may request relevant agencies, organizations and citizens to provide necessary support, assistance and cooperation.



Källa1: <http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/201806/483221713dac4f31bda7f9d951108912.shtml>

Text ovan är översatt och verifierad av personal på Ancautus AB

# National Intelligence Law ("NIL"),

## Bl.a Informationsinhämtning

### Article 16

When performing tasks in accordance with the law, the staff of the national intelligence work agency, in accordance with relevant state regulations, after approval and proof of identity can enter the restricted areas and places, and can ask relevant agencies, organizations and individuals for information and inquiries. Staff can consult or retrieve related files, materials, and articles.

### Article 17

According to work needs and in accordance with relevant national regulations, the staff of the national intelligence work agency may preferentially use or requisition the vehicles, communication tools, venues and buildings of relevant agencies, organizations and individuals in accordance with the law. When necessary, they may set up relevant workplaces and equipment, the facilities shall be returned or restored in time after the tasks are completed, and corresponding expenses shall be paid in accordance with relevant regulations; if losses are caused, compensation shall be made.



Källa1: <http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/201806/483221713dac4f31bda7f9d951108912.shtml>

Text ovan är översatt och verifierad av personal på Ancautus AB

# Vad betyder detta då?

- "Alla" som har något att vinna, bedriver någon form av informationsinhämtning för att skydda och stärka sig och de "sina".

Detta inkluderar stater, leverantörer, konkurrenter och kriminella

- Vid nyttjande av produkter/lösningar/tjänster som har någon koppling till en annan part/stat, måste detta hot tas i beaktning.

# Vad kan göras?

- Inse att hotet och riskerna med informationsinhämtning och extern påverkan är reellt
- Inse att det är inte **om** verksamheten är intressant, utan **när** och **vad** i verksamheten som är intressant
- Vid behov, analysera, kontrollera och verifiera produkter/lösningar utifrån identifierade risker
- Segmentera/separera produkter/lösningar, kontrollera och verifiera kommunikation (ingress och egress)
- Analysera tillgänglighetskrav och eventuellt säkerställ redundant säker kommunikation om trådlöskommunikation ska nyttjas
- Agera systematiskt, deterministiskt och spårbart... Men! inte samma fel på samma sätt varje gång.

# Thank you!

 Ancautus

 elastx